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Abstract
Philosophers have argued that the conceivability of philosophical zom-
bies creates problems for physicalism. In response, it has been argued 
that zombies are not conceivable. Eric Marcus (2004), for example, 
challenges the conceivability claim. Torin Alter (2007) argues that 
Marcus’s argument rests on an overly restrictive principle of imagina-
tion. I agree that the argument relies on an overly restrictive principle of 
imagination, but argue that Alter has not put his finger on the right one. 
In short, Marcus’s argument fails, but not for the reasons Alter gives.
Keywords
Zombies, conceivability, imagination, first-person perspective, third-
person perspective
Eric Marcus (2004) challenges the conceivability of philosophical 
zombies.1 Torin Alter (2007) argues that Marcus’s argument rests on 
a questionable assumption, which he calls the entailment principle.2
(EP) To imagine the instantiation of a negative property N, one must 
imagine the instantiation of some positive property P that entails N. 
(Alter 2007: 93)
Because this assumption is false, Alter argues, Marcus’s conclusion 
that zombies are inconceivable does not trouble the anti-physicalist 
argument that depends on the conceivability of zombies.3 In this 
note, I argue that Marcus’s argument does not rest on the entailment 
principle but on the following principle of imagination.
1 By ‘zombies’ I mean creatures who are physically, functionally and behavior-
ally identical to us but not phenomenally conscious. 
2 See Marcus 2004.
3 See Chalmers 1996.
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The principle of imagining subjective properties: To imagine the 
presence or absence of a subjective property, one must do so from 
the first-person point of view.
I discuss Alter’s response to Marcus and show that it fails to do justice 
to Marcus’s focus on first-person and third-person forms of imagina-
tion. I then show that Marcus’s argument relies on the principle of 
imagining subjective properties and argue that this principle is overly 
restrictive. So, Alter is right that Marcus relies on an overly restric-
tive assumption, but he has not put his finger on the right one.
1 Alter’s interpretation of Marcus
Many grant that zombies are conceivable.4 Marcus holds that zom-
bies only appear to be conceivable. For him, when one mistakenly 
believes one has imagined a zombie world, one has actually imagined 
a world that mirrors ours in terms of its physical, functional, and 
behavioral properties5 and merely refrained from imagining the phe-
nomenal properties of this world. Put another way: claims to con-
ceive of a world identical to ours in terms of physical, functional and 
behavioral properties but without phenomenal properties are claims 
about acts or processes of conceiving and not the objects or products of 
such conceiving. For Marcus, more work needs to be done to con-
ceive of a zombie world.6
Alter argues that this demand for more imaginative work rests on 
the entailment principle.
(EP) To imagine the instantiation of a negative property N, one 
must imagine the instantiation of some positive property P that 
entails N.
4 In this note, I use ‘to imagine’ and ‘to conceive’ interchangeably.
5 In other words, a world with individuals who are like us in terms of their 
physical constitution, their non-qualitative intentional lives, and their behavior.
6 In this note, I assume that there is a distinction between phenomenal con-
sciousness and access consciousness. The coherence of the zombie scenario de-
pends on this assumption, so I grant it for the sake of discussion. 
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According to Alter, Marcus’s core idea is that to successfully imag-
ine a zombie world we must imagine a positive property that entails 
the negative property being a world without phenomenal consciousness. 
Marcus says there is no such positive property, so we cannot 
imagine zombies.
To support attributing this principle to Marcus, Alter cites 
the following.
[E]mpty rooms, empty heads, houses with no one home, and vast 
stretches of Nebraska are imaginable. In general, empty space is imag-
inable. In these cases, however, absence is imaginable against the back-
ground of presence — the presence of rooms, heads, houses, cows, 
and, in general, space. But there is nothing comparable in the case of 
the nothing it’s like to be a zombie. There is no inner border or back-
ground of inner space against which it is possible to conceive subjec-
tive absence. Imagining subjective absence presents an insurmountable 
obstacle. (Marcus 2004: 483)
Marcus does at times focus on the impossibility of imagining subjec-
tive absence. The basic idea here is that to ensure that we have imag-
ined a world that truly lacks phenomenal consciousness, we have to 
imagine the lack of subjective properties in the world, and Marcus 
holds that we can do so only from the first-person point of view. Ac-
cording to Marcus when we imagine a scenario from the first-person 
point of view, we imagine what it is like to occupy some point of 
view in the scenario. From such a point of view, though, we cannot 
imagine a lack of phenomenal consciousness; when we take up such 
a viewpoint we thereby imagine a world with phenomenal proper-
ties because imagining first-personally requires the instantiation of 
some phenomenal properties in the imagined scenario.7 This prob-
lem, though, has nothing directly to do with imagining a positive 
property that entails some other negative property. The quote above 
does mention our ability to imagine the non-existence of some fea-
ture against various backdrops, but these examples are supposed to 
show that the case of imagining zombies from the first-person point 
7  It would be possible by Marcus’s lights to imagine a world lacking in some 
of the subjective properties of our world. A world with no color experiences can 
be imagined from the first-person point of view; some of the phenomenal prop-
erties of our world (what it is like to see various colors) are not instantiated. But 
imagining a complete lack of subjective properties from the first-person point of 
view is not possible.
of view is distinct from these other examples where we can imagine 
the lack of some feature from the third-person point of view. Mar-
cus’s point is that the difficulty is not simply imagining the absence 
of some property. As his examples bring out, imagining such absence 
is often easy. The zombie case is special; to ensure that the world 
we imagine is one without subjective properties, we must take up 
the first-person point of view, but in doing so we thereby imagine a 
world with phenomenal consciousness.
Alter concedes that he may not have put his finger on the correct 
assumption driving Marcus’s argument, suggesting at one point that 
perhaps it rests on a more specific version of EP.
(EP’) To imagine, from the first-person perspective, the instantiation 
of a negative property N, one must imagine, from that perspective, the 
instantiation of some positive property P that entails N. (Alter 2007: 94) 
This talk of imagining a scenario from the first-person perspective 
brings us closer to Marcus’s actual argument, but the focus on posi-
tive and negative properties continues to run interference.
Despite this distracting focus on the entailment principle, Alter 
does cite the following reminder from Marcus, which makes it clear 
that the barrier to imagining zombies lies in concerns about imagin-
ing zombies from a certain points of view or perspectives and not 
concerns about the need for some positive property that guarantees 
a lack of consciousness.
It is worth emphasizing that it is crucial for the argument in favor of 
the possibility of zombies that the conceivability of zombies be in part 
a matter of first-person imagining. As I hope is already clear, no purely 
third-person imagining by itself will conjure up the alleged zombie-
world. (Marcus 2004: 483)
The demand here is clearly put in terms of imagining the situation from 
a specific point of view and not on imagining a positive property that 
will entail the lack of consciousness. I suspect that Alter let the passage 
about imagining emptiness against a background of presence drive his 
interpretation of Marcus’s argument. To make proper sense of the ar-
gument, though, we have to recognize that the key difficulty in imag-
ining zombies results from Marcus’s demand that we imagine zombies 
from a point of view from which we cannot actually imagine zombies.8
8 For what it is worth, I think that Alter is too quick to dismiss EP. Nothing 
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Alter does discuss another potential argument. Here is his 
characterization.
If, in trying to imagine total subjective absence, we use something of 
the what-it-is-like variety — a phenomenal quality — then we are not 
imagining total subjective absence: the phenomenal quality we use is 
subjectively present. (Alter 2007: 96)
This is closer, but it leaves out Marcus’s explanation for why we must 
use a phenomenal property in imagining total subjective absence. 
There is no mention of the principle of imagining subjective proper-
ties. Without mentioning this principle, Alter attributes a very bad 
argument to Marcus. On the latest diagnosis, Marcus is quite con-
fused about how imagination works. Alter appears to accuse Marcus 
of thinking that if we employ the notion of a phenomenal property 
in imagining some scenario, then there are phenomenal properties 
instantiated in the scenario. We of course use our concept of a phe-
nomenal property when we imagine the zombie world, but we do 
not thereby imagine any referents of the concept existing. Imagina-
tion often works this way. When I imagine a world in which God 
does not exist, I employ the concept of God in the act of imagining 
this world, but it is important that I imagine that the concept has no 
referent. Marcus’s argument would be poor indeed if he were argu-
ing that because we must use the concept of a phenomenal property 
to imagine the zombie world, we thereby imagine a world with phe-
nomenal properties.9
in my own critique of his interpretation hangs on the truth of EP, but I think it 
is a principle that can protect us from modal error. Take the case of a godless 
world. Surely we must, in a philosophical context, be able to point to some posi-
tive property in the world that entails or guarantees the non-existence of God 
in order to be sure that we have imagined a godless world. Here is an example: 
the property of being a world that satisfies the philosophical naturalist’s theory 
of the world.
9 This is as bad as saying that imagining a world with no such country as the 
United States involves the concept of the United States and is thereby a world 
with the actual United States in it.
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2 First-person and third-person perspectives in imagina-
tion and Marcus’s argument
Alter is right to be suspicious that Marcus is indeed working with an 
overly restrictive principle of imagination; he has just not identified 
the correct one. One cannot make proper sense of Marcus’s argu-
ment without appreciating his emphasis on first-person and third-
person ways of imagining scenarios. I have touched on this distinc-
tion. Here is Marcus himself.
The imagined difference between zombies and us is purely first-per-
sonal or subjective. What is such a difference? As typically understood, 
a first-person difference is a difference of what it’s like . . . To imagine 
Abe Lincoln third-personally is to imagine the way his parts are laid 
out in space. To imagine him first-personally is to consider how the 
world appeared to him, to imagine feeling what he felt, experiencing 
his moods, and so forth. To imagine a subjective difference between 
Abe Lincoln and someone else is to imagine a difference in what it’s 
like to be them. (Marcus 2004: 482)
Here Marcus notes that there are at least two distinct ways one can 
imagine a world. One can imagine first-personally by placing oneself 
in the world and imagine experiencing that world. One can imagine 
third-personally by imagining a world but not imagining what it is 
like to be in that world.10 For example, I can imagine scoring the 
winning goal of the final of the 2014 World Cup first-personally. 
I imagine experiencing the elation, joy and adrenaline that results 
from such a feat. I can imagine that same situation from a third-
person point of view, too. I picture myself scoring the winning goal 
in the final of the 2014 World Cup from the point of view of an 
outsider.11 I do not imagine what it’s like to do this. I just see myself 
doing it as spectators in the stands would or perhaps as television 
viewers would. This distinction between first-person and third-per-
10 There are interesting things to say here about ways of imagining a scenario. 
I do not have the space to consider more detailed distinctions. See Shoemaker 
1994 and Nagel 1974 for related discussions.
11 It is perhaps important not to imagine myself doing this from the standpoint 
of being a spectator, because that may be incoherent. How can I be in the stands 
and score the winning goal at the same time? To imagine third-personally does 
not require that one is in the situation at all. One may simply take a God’s-eye-
view of things wherein one is not located in the scenario at all.
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son imagining does not track whether or not the subject doing the 
imagining has his or her normal identity in the scenario in question, 
but whether the subject imagines what it is like to be experiencing a 
given scenario or whether the subject imagines the situation without 
imagining directly experiencing the scenario.12
Consider the following from Marcus regarding the ability to 
imagine zombies first-personally.
To imagine zombies first-personally, then, is to imagine what it’s like 
to be a zombie. What is it like to be a zombie? Well, zombies are beings 
without consciousness. There is nothing that it’s like to be a zombie. 
To imagine zombies first-personally is to imagine first-person noth-
ingness. The difference between Abe and Zombie-Abe is that there is 
something it’s like to be Abe, and nothing it’s like to be Zombie-Abe. 
So, when we add third-person duplication to first-person absence, 
we’ve imagined zombies. (Marcus 2004: 482-483)
Imagining zombies first-personally is required to properly imagine 
zombies according to Marcus, but this is a problem because we can-
not imagine first-person absence for the reasons rehearsed earlier.
But why must we imagine zombies from the first-person point of 
view? Recall the reminder.
It is worth emphasizing that it is crucial for the argument in favor of 
the possibility of zombies that the conceivability of zombies be in part 
a matter of first-person imagining. As I hope is already clear, no purely 
third-person imagining by itself will conjure up the alleged zombie-
world.
Marcus references Saul Kripke’s conceivability argument against the 
identity theory here and the fact that being in pain must be imagined 
from the first-person point of view. The only acceptable method, ac-
cording to Marcus, for imagining the existence of subjective proper-
ties in a scenario is to imagine them from the first person point of view.
Let me lay out the argument.
12 As Shoemaker (1994) notes, it may not always be possible to imagine oneself 
being the subject when one imagines what it is like to be the subject of a scenario. 
For example, I can imagine what it’s like for the world’s greatest soccer player, 
Lionel Messi, to dribble by me, an amateur soccer player, while I can also imagine 
what it is like to be outmaneuvered by him. I do not thereby imagine being myself 
and being Messi in that scenario. I imagine having the experience myself and I 
also imagine what it would be like for him to have such an experience.
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(1) One can imagine situations first-personally or third-personally.
(2) Imagined scenarios have subjective and objective properties.
(3) One must imagine the existence or non-existence of the sub-
jective properties of a scenario first-personally.
(4) If zombies are phenomenally conscious, their phenomenal 
conscious properties are subjective properties.
(5) In order to examine whether or not zombies have phenomenally 
conscious properties, one must imagine them first-personally.
(6) We cannot imagine zombies first-personally because imagin-
ing a scenario from the first-person point of view is thereby 
imagining a scenario with phenomenal consciousness.
(3) expresses the principle of imagining subjective properties. It is 
needed for this argument to go through. If (3) is false, then (5) does 
not follow, and we therefore avoid the difficult Marcus presents.
Marcus does not devote much of an argument to (3). He makes 
the brief reference to Kripke’s conceivability argument, and he also 
notes that subjective properties “are graspable only from a first-per-
son point of view” (Marcus 2004: 482). We should resist (3), be-
cause there is an important distinction Marcus does not draw out, 
one which is detrimental to his argument.
In one sense, it is true that one must imagine the subjective prop-
erties of a scenario from the first-person point of view. To imagine 
what it is like to skydive, for example, I must do so from the first-
person point of view. In this sense, it is true to say that subjective 
properties are only graspable from the first-person point of view. 
However, I need not imagine a situation from the first-person point 
of view in order to know whether or not subjective properties are 
instantiated in it. Consider an example. I imagine my brother sky-
diving for the first time. No matter the detail I add, no matter the 
objective properties I imagine being instantiated (the location, time, 
weather conditions, nature of his jump, etcetera), I also imagine that 
there is something it is like for him to make the jump. In the sce-
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nario there are subjective properties instantiated even though I do 
not imagine the scenario from the first-person point of view. There 
is no problem in granting this natural claim. It is not as if I remain 
in a state of uncertainty about whether my brother as I imagine him 
has or lacks phenomenal consciousness. From a third-person point 
of view, I imagine him making the jump and imagine that there is 
something it is like for him to make the jump — without imagin-
ing experiencing those things myself.13 Marcus holds that one can 
only know that a subjective property is instantiated if one imagines 
experiencing or not experiencing that property directly in the imag-
ined scenario. But there are plenty of cases where we can imagine 
the characters in imagined situations having experiences even if we 
ourselves are not imagining ourselves having those very experiences. 
One need not imagine experiencing a subjective property being in-
stantiated in an imagined scenario to be sure that it is instantiated, as 
my example shows. Therefore, the principle of imagining subjective 
properties is an implausible principle of imagination.
Some may reply that the principle of imagining subjective prop-
erties is needed to protect against modal error.14 How can I be sure 
that I have imagined a scenario in which there is something it is like 
for my brother to skydive if I do not imagine — from his own point 
of view — what it is like or not like for him? Without the space to 
offer a theory of modal error, let me examine the scope for error in 
the current example. Despite my claim to have imagined subjective 
properties from a third-person point of view, I may have actually 
misdescribed the situation. I described it as one in which my brother 
does experience skydiving. Perhaps it is a more complicated case, 
one in which he does skydive but experiences nothing. Let us sup-
pose he has passed out right before the jump. That would be a situ-
ation in which he lacks phenomenal consciousness of the jump. But 
notice what I have done. I have added a supposition to the situation 
that explains the lack of phenomenal consciousness. As the situa-
13 I may even imagine that he feels scared before the jump, feels exhilarated 
during the jump, and feels relieved and full of adrenaline after the jump from the 
third-person point of view. These subjective properties are instantiated in the 
imagined scenario even though I do not imagine myself having these experiences. 
14 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this concern.
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tion was initially described — without this supposition — it does 
not seem possible that I could be mistaken. Indeed we can create 
different scenarios in which there is no phenomenal consciousness, 
but these are distinct from the original for they build in new details. 
Imagination may have some similarities to perception, but one thing 
is for certain: the scope for error in imagination is much narrower 
than in perception. Error is no doubt possible, but in order to be 
mistaken about the phenomenal properties in the skydiving scenario, 
I would need to build more detail into the scenario that explains how 
my brother fails to experience anything. I need to, in effect, imagine 
a distinct scenario.
In conclusion, once we properly appreciate the role that first-per-
son and third-person perspectives in imagination play in Marcus’s 
argument, we can see exactly where things go wrong: his implau-
sible view of what is required to reveal the existence of subjective 
properties in imagined scenarios. While I am somewhat skeptical 
of our ability to conceive of philosophical zombies, we do not fail 
to imagine them because we fail to imagine the absence of subjec-
tive properties from a perspective that necessarily instantiates such 
properties, for there is no good reason to hold that we must imagine 
the instantiation of subjective properties in imagined scenarios only 
from the first-person point of view.15
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